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Preface
The Southern Africa region has experienced more than its fair share of problems in recent years. Just when it seemed that the hardships wrought by the devastating cycle of droughts and floods of 2000 to 2002 were a thing of the past, other problems emerged. At one level, there have been the weak and often erratic governance mechanisms and political crises in some countries of the region, leading to severe disruptions in agricultural production to the point that supplies and markets have virtually disappeared. At another level, socio-cultural rigidities have often militated against the adoption of efficient farming practices, resulting in sub-optimal choices that lock smallholders into a low equilibrium trap. In the face of the disappearing supplies and missing markets, these have engendered hyper-inflationary trends of a magnitude unknown anywhere else in the world. But in the midst of all this apparent dreariness, cases are emerging from which immense lessons can be drawn.
This book assembles a collection of research papers based on studies completed in 2008 and 2009 in Southern Africa that examine various dimensions of the problem. Despite its title, the book does not exclusively subscribe to the notion of institutions as constraints in the sense that all they merely perform a restrictive function on economic behaviour. The various contributions to this book cover the spectrum of viewpoints about what institutions constitute and the multiple roles they also play in conditioning economic behaviour by modifying the structure of incentives and enhancing deeper understanding of the workings of the processes that determine economic activity. These perspectives are taken in examining the institutional environment in which small farmers operate in the region and how they are going about either dealing/coping with them (in the case of constraints), or taking advantage of them (in the case of the opportunities afforded by new incentive structures or information).
The papers draw from these diverse and polar experiences and present some theoretical and practical insights that should form the basis for more in-depth, country-level, sector-specific analyses, focusing mainly on citrus, horticultures, cotton and livestock. The thematic issues of income inequality, land reform, value chain governance and chain choice, and natural resource management are covered in this book and expected to hold strong interest for a wide constituency, including researchers, development practitioners, rural animators, and policy makers.
The bulk of the chapters in this book have been based on a study funded under the Southern African Development Community's Fund for Innovative Regional Collaborative Projects (FIRCOP). In late 2003, SADC called for concept notes and received a total of 104 out of which 35 were selected in August 2004. The 35 researchers and groups were contacted to submit full proposals out of which 10 were short-listed for a final selection process that resulted in the approval of 6 projects for funding in 2006. The elaborate review process and the efforts of the anonymous reviewers over an unprecedented period of three years are acknowledged.
Subsequently, the study resulted in a number of dissertations leading to the award of Masters degrees to several students. Eight external examiners and four internal examiners were involved in the formal examination of the original dissertations. In addition, two examiners were involved in the examination of the Swaziland maize market study. The chapter based on that study is the source of three separate papers presented, after double blind reviews, at the After the chapters were assembled into a manuscript for the publication of the present book, an initial workshop was held at which researchers and practitioners drawn from numerous Universities and research and development organizations were represented. This workshop allowed participants to make major inputs that led to the restructuring of the outline as well as modifications to the content. Two other peer reviewers, namely Professor Noble Jackson Nweze of the Department of Agricultural Economics of the University of Nigeria, and Dr Godfrey Kundhlande of the Department of Agricultural Economics of the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, received the complete manuscript and provided detailed comments which were incorporated during January-June 2010. All these contributions are gratefully acknowledged. 
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Abstract
Smallholder farming in Southern Africa has been on the decline in recent years as a result of a combination of institutional, climatic and macro-economic constraints. This has led to some of the worst food and humanitarian crisis in recent years, culminating in drastic food shortages and famines and deepening poverty. Governments and the development community are therefore concerned about the current and potential consequences of this state-of-affairs and are exploring ways and means to reverse the situation. There is increasing awareness about the role of institutions in smallholder development in the region and elsewhere on the continent. But consensus as to what specific institutions are crucial or even how they exert their influence has not yet been achieved despite a considerable amount of theoretical information now available on the subject. This chapter begins the task of defining the broad outlines of a more focused study on the role of institutions in small farmer situations in Southern Africa and proposes an analytical framework consolidated from a wide range of expert views and opinions. Brief descriptions of the diverse studies that fit that framework are provided to attempt to contribute to a debate on the feasible procedures for undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the institutional constraints faced by the small farmer in relation to market access and exploring the competitiveness of the small-scale agriculture in the region.
Introduction
The initial case for investigating the institutional constraints to smallholder development was pivoted on the reality that smallholder farming in Southern Africa was going through one of its toughest times in history. The scale of the problem was virtually unknown in contemporary experience. The conviction drew largely from literature as well as practical experience with the development terrain in the region as the transition into the new other unfavourable weather conditions coinciding with the planting and harvesting of both winter and summer crops in 2001, severely dislocated the sector's investment profile and created unprecedented deficits as most fields were uncultivated and most crops could not be harvested. By 2002, this situation had placed about 444,800 persons in at least 3 districts cereal production in the order of 55% below previous year results and 60% below average The leaders were undoubtedly convinced that potential exists for African countries to expand agricultural output and turn the sector into a profitable one. For instance, in the late 1990s, the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) commissioned several studies to assess the Economic Comparative Advantage (CEA) of Southern African countries in agricultural production. The studies concluded that many of these countries, including Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, possess economic comparative advantages in a wide variety of agricultural products whose production would significantly and positively impact on both farmer and national welfare (Nakhumwa et al., 1999; Sukume et al., 2000).
The foregoing clearly suggests that there is strong political commitment for small farmer development at both the national and regional levels. It is also clear that policy makers in the region have come to the realization that alternative policies that ignore small farmer These views go to the heart of the arguments that proponents of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) have been making for sometime now. As soon as it became clear that Adam Smith's reference to the 'invisible hand' idea never meant that a selfish, mindless, emotionless and value-free mechanism exists for allocating resources to meet the productive ends of society, economists became even more single-minded in advancing the notion of the primacy of institutions. According to North (1992), the efficient markets that are predicted by the neo-classical assumption of instrumental rationality are not achievable in reality because of the numerous shortcomings in the economic system. For instance, the induced innovation model that assumes perfect markets for factors and products, fails to consider situations where prices do not convey all the information needed to decide between alternatives courses of action. The model also assumes that all economic agents in a transaction face the same prices, which would mean that transactions are cost-free and asset distribution would have no effect on efficient allocation of resources, among other conveniences. But nothing can be farther from the truth.
Everybody from North (1992) to Dequech (2002) and Frank (2009), doubts that we are close to a definitive theory of institutions that provides the final answers to these questions. But it is not debatable that transactions involve costs which can often be so high that they constitute veritable obstacles to production and exchange. These transaction costs embrace elements as diverse as the costs of adjustment, information, measuring attributes, and negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts. Human beings are frequently constrained by incomplete information as well as the limited mental capacity for processing whatever information is available (North, 1992) . Attempts to overcome these shortcomings impose considerable costs on economic agents. As well, since different economic agents face different prices, there is a tendency for some people to take advantage of others, again due to differential access to information about current and prospective costs and prices, a phenomenon that Akerlof (1970) exploited and elaborated into the sub-discipline of information asymmetries. Information about the possibilities open to human beings to better their lives is never perfect and they have to act often on the basis of hunches and gut feelings which are presented under the more dignified caption of 'perceptions' .
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Externalities are another reason that efficient markets do not automatically materialize from the actions of economic agents; benefits and costs of production, marketing and consumption activities accruing to other than those directly responsible for the activities (Frank, 1994) . Economists believe that dealing with these problems through collective action is the basis for the evolution of institutions. In turn, institutions contribute to growth in output in agriculture by altering the incentives, rights to use of available productive resources, and knowledge and skills to use what is available or develop new ways and means to attain the goals of economic activity (Eicher and Staatz, 1984; North, 1992). The diverse actions and arrangements that produce the foregoing outcomes, which can broadly be described as coordinating and facilitating actions, can also be included as part of these institutions to obtain what Eicher (1999) describes as 'a good institutional environment' . All these elements, be they formal or informal, which modify the incentive structure, set the rules of engagement in respect to resource use and human interactions, and guarantee some measure of predictability in the system by removing uncertainties, constitute institutions as North (2003) In the views of Norton et al. (2006) , institutions and the human factor interact to determine the farming system. The implication is that these factors are also involved in system performance, as noted by North (1990 North ( , 1992 North ( , 2003 . If formal rules and informal norms recognize and imbue individuals with property rights in some productive resources but they lack sufficient information to efficiently utilize the resources, performance is affected negatively. Information asymmetry in the way George Akerlof (2001) has described it in his Nobel Lecture thus becomes an important institutional factor or enforcement characteristics governing access to markets for producers. This link has also been made by Van Huylenbroeck and Espinel (2007) on the basis of case studies of small livestock producers in Uganda, crop farmers on an irrigation scheme in the Peninsula of Santa Elena (Ecuador), and a biodiversity preservation scheme. So, rules and norms confer rights and individuals are able to take advantage of such rights under appropriate conditions such as affordable prices, access to credit and other facilitating services, effective infrastructure, adequate security, etc. Many or all of these require that appropriate and well-functioning organizations and political systems are in place to provide the requisite governance. It is therefore understandable that institutions can be viewed quite broadly as 'the structure that humans impose on human interactions' (North, 1990). Table 1 .1 attempts to condense 1. Investigating institutional constraints to smallholder development these thoughts into a framework that recognizes the ubiquity of institutions and how the diverse elements can be applied for enhanced performance.
Many countries in Africa have since the 1990s been dismantling government controls and converting to market-based food systems, believing that market reforms would enhance farm profitability through their positive effects on prices, investment levels, and commercialization ( Jayne et al., 1997). In fact, the need for such agrarian reforms, including commercialization of the smallholder production systems, has received considerable attention from governments and development organizations, including the SADC (FANRPAN, 2003; Anonymous, 2003) . But the results of the reform programmes have been mixed and frequently inconsistent with the expected increases in productivity.
It is now being realized that the sectoral reform prescriptions have, in many cases, been based upon only superficial knowledge of the prevailing economic institutions and how 
